

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-02 ACDA-05

NSAE-00 PA-01 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 EB-07 OIC-02 CU-02 SS-15 NSC-05 MC-02 /085 W

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R 071730Z FEB 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9985

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4975

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION GENEVA

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 0674

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, CSCE

SUBJECT: CSCE: FEBRUARY 7 NAC CONSULTATIONS-AMBASSADOR SHERER'S
STATEMENT

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE AND USDEL SALT TWO

REF: (A) STATE 27514 (B) GENEVA 610

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AMBASSADOR SHERER'S REMARKS IN FEBRUARY 7
NAC CONSULTATIONS ON CSCE:

BEGIN TEXT

1. MR. CHAIRMAN: ONCE AGAIN THOSE OF US WHO HAVE COME FROM
GENEVA TO JOINT THE COUNCIL IN THIS DISCUSSION CAN BE GRATEFUL FOR
THE INTEREST AND THE UNDERSTANDING WHICH YOU AND THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVES HERE HAVE SHOWN FOR THE CONDUCT OF NEGOTIATIONS
AT THE CSCE.

2. LIKE OTHER DELEGATIONS, WE HAVE BEEN OBSERVING SOVIET BEHAVIOR
IN GENEVA CLOSELY SINCE THE RESUMPTION OF CONFERENCE WORK, IN ORDER
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TO DRAW OUR OWN CONCLUSIONS AS TO HOW THEY NOW INTEND TO PROCEED. OUR
IMPRESSION IS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE DEFINITELY INTERESTED IN CONVEYING
THE IMPRESSION THAT THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD CSCE HAS NOT CHANGED,
ALTHOUGH THEY APPEAR TO BE MORE RELAXED ABOUT PUSHING STAGE II

TO A RAPID CONCLUSION. IN THEIR CONTACTS WITH US THEY HAVE STATED EXPLICITLY THAT THE RENUNCIATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENT WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON THEIR COMMITMENT TO CSCE. THEY HAVE ALSO ALLUDED TO THE FACT THAT THE CONFERENCE WAS THE INITIATIVE OF THE SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY AND GOVERNMENT, AND NOT OF ONE MAN ALONE. THIS IS APPARENTLY THE LINE THEY HAVE FOLLOWED WITH ALL DELEGATIONS.

3. IN THIS SITUATION, THE OVERALL U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD THE CONFERENCE REMAINS AS EXPRESSED IN THE VLADIVSTOK COMMUNIQUE. WE ARE STILL INTERESTED IN MOVING AHEAD IN A BUSINESSLIKE WAY TOWARD THE CONCLUSION OF STAGE II, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT CONFERENCE RESULTS WILL PERMIT HOLDING STAGE III AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. WE BELIEVE IT IS POSSIBLE TO PROCEED IN THIS SENSE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ESSENTIAL WESTERN INTERESTS.

4. AT THE SAME TIME, IT HAS BEEN DISAPPOINTING THAT THE SOVIETS APPARENTLY RETURNED TO GENEVA WITH NO NEW FLEXIBILITY IN THEIR POSITIONS. WHILE THEY TALK ABOUT TIME BEING "PRECIOUS" THEY OFFER NO CONCESSIONS TO MAKE ACCELERATION OF THE CONFERENCE POSSIBLE. THIS IS MOST EVIDENT IN THE MILITARY AREA, WHERE PRAVDA AND AMBASSADOR MENDELEVICH HAVE BLAMED THE WEST FOR HOLDING UP PROGRESS BY MAKING OVER-AMBITIOUS PROPOSALS, AND IN THE THIRD BASKET, WHERE THE SOVIETS ARE NOW SAYING THAT VIRTUALLY EVERYTHING HAS BEEN SETTLED, AND ARE IDENTIFYING CERTAIN PENDING WESTERN PROPOSALS AS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE IN ANY FORM.

5. WE CERTAINLY SHOULD CONTINUE TO OBSERVE SOVIET TACTICS CAREFULLY, AND TO REMAIN ALERT TO THE BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE CSCE.

6. HAVING SAID THIS, I WOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT WE WERE MOST INTERESTED TO RECEIVE THE REPORT OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE OF THE NINE. WE GENERALLY AGREED WITH THAT REPORT, WHICH SUMMARIZES THE PRESENT SITUATION IN CSCE VERY WELL, AND HAVE VERY LITTLE TO ADD TO IT. I WILL THEREFORE TOUCH ON ONLY A FEW
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KEY ISSUES OF CURRENT INTEREST.

7. WITH REGARD TO THE PRINCIPLES DECLARATION, LITTLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS SINCE OUR LAST MEETING WITH THE COUNCIL IN DECEMBER. WE BELIEVE IT POSSIBLE TO CONCLUDE THE FIRST READING OF MOST REMAINING SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS RELATING TO ALL TEN PRINCIPLES BEFORE THE EASTER RECESS.

8. ON MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY, OUR GOAL SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE ATTAINMENT OF A MANEUVERS CBM INCORPORATING THE PARAMETERS WORKED OUT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND AGREED IN THE NAC LAST SEPTEMBER. OUR OPPOSITION TO A CBM COVERING MILITARY MOVEMENTS REMAINS UNCHANGED. WE HAVE NOTED CONCERNS EXPRESSED RECENTLY BY THE POLI-

TICAL DIRECTORS OF THE NINE THAT LEAVING CBMS TO BE NEGOTIATED AT THE END OF STAGE II COULD UNDERMINE WESTERN OBJECTIVES IN THE MILITARY SECURITY FIELD. OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE DISCUSSION IN DUBLIN IS THAT THE NINE WISH EXPLICITLY TO HINGE COMPLETION OF THE FIRST READING OF PRINCIPLES TO PROGRESS ON CBMS. FRANKLY, THE U.S. WOULD HAVE APPRECIATED A MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON THIS MATTER BEFORE IT WAS BROACHED WITH THE SOVIETS, AS HAS NOW APPARENTLY BEEN DONE AT LEAST IN A GENERAL WAY. SPECIFICALLY, WE WOULD HAVE LIKED TO KNOW THE DETAILS OF THIS NEW POSITION ON PART OF THE NINE. A DEFINITION OF ACCEPTABLE PROGRESS ON CBMS IN ANY CASE WOULD SEEM TO BE A TOPIC REQUIRING CLOSE ALLIED CONSULTATION, BEARING IN MIND THAT ALLIANCE POSITIONS-- ON THE MOVEMENTS QUESTION, FOR EXAMPLE, AND SUCH MATTERS AS INDEPENDENT AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS--ARE NOT YET FULLY FIRM. FOR NOW, WE BELIEVE IT IS PREFERABLE TO CONTINUE OUR PATIENT AND FIRM EFFORTS TO MOVE THE SOVIETS TOWARD ACCEPTABLE PARAMETERS ON THE MANEUVERS CBM, WHILE RESERVING MORE FORCEFUL APPROACHES UNTIL LATER IF MOSCOW MAINTAINS ITS TOTALLY NEGATIVE STANCE. THUS, WE DO NOT FAVOR A PUBLIC STATEMENT AT THE END OF THIS MEETING WHICH WOULD UNDERLINE ALLIED CONCERN ABOUT THE LACK OF PROGRESS ON CBMS OR NOTING THE NEED FOR "PARALLELISM" IN CSCE EFFORTS. AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME, WE WOULD BE PREPARED, HOWEVER, TO CONSIDER JOINING A CONSENSUS AMONG OUR ALLIES TO (A) APPROACH THE SOVIETS ON BEHALF OF THE ALLIES ON CBMS, OR (B) RAISE THE LACK OF PROGRESS ON MILITARY SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE CONFERENCE IN THE COORDINATING COMMITTEE.

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION GENEVA

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 0674

9. WE HAVE APPRECIATED THE UNDERSTANDING SHOWN IN THE NATO CAUCUS AT GENEVA FOR THE LEGAL PROBLEMS POSED FOR US BY CERTAIN SPECIFIC

PHRASES IN THE TEXTS WHICH HAVE BEEN AGREED THUS FAR. IN DEFERENCE TO OBJECTIONS EXPRESSED BY A NUMBER OF ALLIES, I CAN TELL YOU THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT REPEAT NOT AT THIS TIME PRESS FOR AN AGREED CONFERENCE STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE RESULTS ARE INTENDED TO BE BINDING POLITICALLY AND MORALLY, BUT NOT LEGALLY. WE MAY BE INTERESTED LATER IN PURSUING THE OTHER IDEAS WHICH HAVE BEEN ADVANCED FOR THE FINAL ACT. HOWEVER, IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A BLANKET STATEMENT, IT WILL BECOME HIGHLY IMPORTANT FOR US DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE CONFERENCE TO ENSURE THAT EACH TEXT IS CAREFULLY CONSIDERED AS IT EVOLVES IN NEGOTIATION TO ENSURE THAT IT DOES NOT IMPLY A HIGHER LEVEL OF OBLIGATION THAN INTENDED. THOSE TEXTS WHICH DO IMPLY A LEGAL COMMITMENT MAY HAVE TO BE TREATED AS SUCH BY THE UNITED STATES, IF THE RECORD DOES NOT PROVIDE EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY. WHILE NOT A PERFECT OUTCOME, IT WILL BE ACCEPTABLE FOR THE UNITED STATES AS LONG AS SUCH TEXTS ARE KEPT TO A MINIMUM AND ARE WITHIN THE POWERS OF THE U.S. EXECUTIVE BRANCH. AS FOR BASKET III TEXTS ALREADY NEGOTIATED, THE FAMILY REUNIFICATION AND MARRAIGES TEXT CONTAIN LANGUAGE WHICH, IF TAKEN AS A LEGAL AGREEMENT, MIGHT BE CONSIDERED TO BE BEYOND THE CONFIDENTIAL

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COMPETENCE OF THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE IN OUR CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM. WE HAVE CONCLUDED, HOWEVER, THAT THOSE TEXTS WILL NOT HAVE TO BE REOPENED, PROVIDED THE HUMAN CONTACTS PREAMBLE PRESENTLY UNDER NEGOTIATION RETAINS LANGUAGE SUPPORTING THE INTERPRETATION THAT ALL THE HUMAN CONTACTS UNDERTAKINGS REPRESENT POLITICAL AND MORAL, RATHER THAN LEGAL, COMMITMENTS. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THIS PREAMBULAR LANGUAGE SHOULD EVOLVE SO AS TO SUGGEST THAT LEGAL AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN CREATED, THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO RECONSIDER THE ADVISABILITY OF A UNILATERAL STATEMENT, AS SUGGESTED BY SEVERAL ALLIED DELEGATIONS, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE HUMAN CONTACTS PREAMBLE IS ONLY OF A MORALLY BINDING NATURE. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, CONSULT FULLY WITH OUR ALLIES AS TO WORDING, TIMING ETC., BEFORE ISSUING SUCH A UNILATERAL STATEMENT.

10. WITH REGARD TO THE MEDITERRANEAN ASPECTS OF CSCE, WE FOUND OUR CONSULTATIONS IN THE NATO CAUCUS AT GENEVA MOST USEFUL. WE REMAIN CONCERNED OVER EFFORTS PRIMARILY BY MALTA, HOWEVER, WHICH WOULD EXCEED THE HELSINKI MANDATES BY DIVERTING THE CONFERENCE FROM ITS PROPER FOCUS ON EUROPE TO A BELABORED CONSIDERATION OF THE NON-PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES IN CSCE DOCUMENTS--AND POSSIBLY IN ARRANGEMENTS FOR STAGE III AND FOLLOW-UP AS WELL. WE FACE A CHOICE--TO STAND ASIDE IN THE HOPE THAT THE EAST MAY BLICK MALTA'S MORE EXTREME PROPOSALS ON MEDITERRANEAN QUESTIONS, OR TO COORDINATE ALLIED POSITIONS IN ORDER TO OPPOSE MALTA'S FAR-REACHING SUGGESTIONS REGARDING THE NON-EUROPEAN LITTORAL STATES AND IRAN.

11. AS FOR FOLLOW-UP, PERHAPS I SHOULD STATE HERE AGAIN THAT OUR SUBSTANTIVE VIEW OF FOLLOW-UP HAS NOT CHANGED. IN VIEW OF THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION IN GENEVA, HOWEVER, WE HAVE BEEN INTERESTED

TO KNOW WHAT, IF ANY, COPROMISE MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE NATO GROUP AT THE END. HERE AGAIN, OUR RECENT CONSULTATIONS IN GENEVA HAVE BEEN MOST USEFUL TO US IN FORMING OUR RECENT CONSULTATIONS IN GENEVA HAVE BEEN MOST USEFUL TO US IN FORMING OUR OWN VIEWS ON THE FURTHER COURSE OF DISCUSSION ON THIS SUBJECT.

12. IN ALL OF THESE AREAS, AS WELL AS THE MORE DETAILED ISSUES WITH WHICH WE HAVE TO DEAL IN CSCE, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT CLOSE ALLIED CONSULTATIONS AND A UNITED WESTERN FRONT WILL BE THE KEY TO ACHIEVING OUR OBJECTIVES DURING THE REMAINDER
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OF STAGE II. WE, FOR OUR PART, WILL TRY TO MAKE THIS CONSULTATION PROCESS AS MEANINGFUL AND AS FRUITFUL AS POSSIBLE.

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